Tornado Cash Loses Motion to Dismiss

The judge in the Tornado Cash case delivered an oral ruling today, rejecting both the Defense’s motion to compel discovery and their motion to dismiss the charges. This represents a massive setback for the Defense, and the judge’s reasoning may not bode well for developers and projects going forward.

Motion to Compel

The Defense’s motion to compel discovery sought to access a broad range of government communications, including exchanges with foreign authorities under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and with domestic agencies like the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Defense argued that these materials were essential to understanding the government’s case and could potentially include exculpatory evidence. The judge, however, made it clear that Rule 16 imposes a stringent requirement: the Defense must show that the requested information is material to their case, not merely speculate on its potential usefulness.

The court dismissed the Defense’s arguments as speculative, noting that references to what the information “might” or “could” reveal do not meet the necessary standard for materiality. For example, the Defense argued that MLAT communications with the Dutch government might shed light on the evidence against Tornado Cash or reveal the government’s investigative theories. The judge found this reasoning unpersuasive, emphasizing that materiality cannot be established through conjecture or vague assertions.

The court similarly rejected the Defense’s request for all communications between the government and OFAC and FinCEN. Although the Defense claimed these documents were necessary to understand the government’s theories and potential witnesses, the judge concluded that the Defense failed to demonstrate how these communications were directly relevant to the charges at hand. The court reiterated that the burden is on the Defense to show a specific link between the requested documents and their defense strategy, a burden they did not meet.

When the Defense suggested an in-camera review—a private examination by the judge of the requested documents—to determine their materiality, the court refused. The judge argued that granting such a request based on speculative assertions would set a dangerous precedent, effectively forcing in-camera reviews in all criminal cases when a defendant speculates about the relevance of certain documents. This, the judge stressed, would undermine the purpose of Rule 16 and transform the pretrial discovery process into an unrestrained search for potentially helpful evidence.

The Defense also raised concerns under Brady v. Maryland, arguing that the government might be withholding exculpatory or impeachable evidence. While the court acknowledged the government’s obligations under Brady, it found no indication that these duties had been neglected. Without concrete evidence suggesting the government was withholding information, the court saw no reason to compel additional disclosures. The judge cautioned that while the Defense’s arguments were theoretically possible, they lacked the factual support needed to warrant the court’s intervention. She did say, however, that if she later finds that the government has “interpreted its obligations too narrowly” then there will be “unfortunate consequences for their case.”

Motion to Dismiss

The motion to dismiss presented a much more significant set of issues. Central to the Defense’s argument was the definition of a “money transmitter” under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The Defense contended that Tornado Cash did not qualify as a money transmitter because it did not exercise control over users’ funds; it merely facilitated the movement of cryptocurrencies. The court, however, rejected this narrow interpretation. The judge clarified that the BSA’s scope does not require the control of the funds; Tornado Cash’s role in facilitating, anonymizing, and transferring cryptocurrency was sufficient to bring it within the statute’s ambit. The judge likened Tornado Cash to custodial mixers, which have been deemed money transmitting businesses.

Further complicating the Defense’s argument was their reliance on the 2019 FinCEN guidance, which uses a four-factor test to determine whether a wallet provider is a money transmitter. The Defense claimed this guidance, which includes a “total independent control” standard, should apply to Tornado Cash. The court disagreed, stating that this standard is specific to wallet providers and does not extend to mixers like Tornado Cash. Consequently, Tornado Cash’s lack of “total independent control” over funds was irrelevant to its classification as a money transmitter.

Another key point in the court’s analysis was the distinction between expressive and functional code under the First Amendment. The Defense argued that prosecuting Storm for his involvement with Tornado Cash was tantamount to punishing him for writing code, which they claimed was protected speech. The judge acknowledged that while code can be considered expressive, the specific use of code to facilitate illegal activities—such as money laundering or sanctions evasion—falls outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. The judge emphasized that the court must focus on the conduct enabled by the code, not merely the code itself. Even under intermediate scrutiny, which applies to content-neutral restrictions on speech, the judge found that the government’s interests in preventing money laundering and regulating unlicensed money transmission justified the restrictions imposed by the relevant statutes.

The court also addressed concerns about the immutability of Tornado Cash’s smart contracts, an issue raised by both parties. The judge acknowledged the existence of a factual dispute but noted that it was not a decisive factor in the current motion. However, the issue of immutability may play a role at trial in determining the extent of Storm’s control over the service and his responsibility for its operations.

In concluding remarks, the judge underscored that while the use of code to communicate ideas may be protected under the First Amendment, using that code to facilitate illegal activities is not. This distinction is critical in the context of emerging technologies like blockchain, where the line between speech and conduct can be blurred. The court’s ruling serves as a reminder that the legal system is prepared to hold participants in the digital economy accountable, even as it grapples with the complexities of applying traditional legal principles to new and evolving technologies.

The full transcript of the ruling will be released once prepared by the court reporter.

This is a guest post by Colin Crossman. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.